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The Politics of Violence in Kenya* 
 
By Susanne D. Mueller 
 
Introduction 
“So this is how it begins” (a Kenyan political scientist, Nairobi, January 2008). 
To the outside world, Kenya in 2007 was a model of stability and future possibilities. The 
draconian repression experienced under President Moi in the 1980s and 1990s finally had 
ended. It was replaced with hard-fought-for freedoms of speech, the press, and association. 
They emerged towards the end of Moi’s rule and were expanded after President Kibaki’s 
election in 2002. The days of imprisonment, detention without trial, and torture of opposition 
party supporters were gone. Kenya’s once vibrant economy had been decimated and brought 
to its knees by Moi. However, by 2007, just five years after installing a new government, 
Kenya had an annual growth rate of over 6% and was poised to do even better. The mood 
was optimistic and most thought Kenya was back on an economic roll. Some in government 
spoke of Kenya following East Asia’s “tigers,” and becoming another Newly Industrialized 
Country (NIC). This was just one side of the story.  
The other was captured by Kenya’s low scores on the World Bank’s Governance 
Indicators, placing it below the mean for Sub-Saharan Africa in three of the following four 
areas: government effectiveness (28%/28%), political stability (15%/35.6%), control of 
corruption (16%/30%), and the rule of law (15.7%/28.8%).1 Kenya was still rocked by 
financial scandals at the top of government, its infrastructure continued to crumble, and 
foreign companies were still skittish about investing in the country.2 Crime, including 
gunfights in the central business district of Nairobi, carjacking, holdups in houses, and 
gangland style murders, peppered the lives of ordinary Kenyans and others. This duality of 
both positive transformation and imminent decay aptly characterized Kenya in the post-Moi 
era.  
                                                
* I wish to thank Phil Keefer, Lead Economist, Development Research Group (DRCRG), World Bank, for 
his comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
1 World Bank, World Bank Governance Indicators http://info.worldbank.org/governance/ 
wgi2007/sc_country.asp. 
2 Between 1999 and 2002, 140 foreign companies left Kenya. Musambayi Katumanga, “A City Under 
Siege: Banditry and Modes of Accumulation in Nairobi, 1991–2004,” Review of African Political Economy 106 
(2005), 505–20. 
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The thesis of what follows goes beyond the above description of duality. It argues 
that Kenya was precariously perched and poised to implode3 even before the 2007 
presidential election because of three underlying precipitating factors. These factors put 
Kenya on a dangerous precipice notwithstanding the many impressive changes experienced 
under its new government. The argument presented here is that the 2007 election, which was 
too close to call beforehand and contested afterwards, was the spark that ignited them. 
Hence, Kenya’s descent into a spiral of killing and destruction along ethnic lines and the 
consequent fracturing of the fragile idea of nation was not altogether surprising. 
This paper identifies these underlying precipitating factors as follows: a gradual 
frittering away of the states monopoly of legitimate force and a consequent generalized level 
of violence not always within its control; deliberately weak institutions, mostly overridden by 
a highly personalized and centralized presidency, that could and did not exercise the 
autonomy or checks and balances normally associated with democracies; and political parties 
that were not programmatic, were driven by ethnic clientism, and had a winner-take-all view 
of political power and its associated economic byproducts.  
The argument presented here has three components: that violence was diffused, could 
be easily ignited, but not controlled, and was; that institutions outside the presidency 
normally associated with vetting a contested election were not viewed as being sufficiently 
neutral to do so, and did not; and that the nature of Kenya party politics predisposed both 
leaders and followers to see politics as a do or die zero sum game, which is what the 2007 
election became. Had the election not been so close, these same factors might have been held 
in check. However, they were nevertheless dangerous and looming problems. This paper 
discusses these factors and shows why they were ignited by the 2007 contested election. It 
argues that two of the three factors—weak institutions and ethnically driven clientist political 
parties—are common in Africa and therefore cannot alone be viewed as causal factors. It 
maintains that diffused violence upped the ante, with a too-close-to-call election raising the 
stakes in causal terms.  
The aim of what follows is to analyze the above precipitating factors in the context of 
Kenya’s political history. It is also to place the discussion within the framework of 
contemporary political economy analysis, and to raise questions concerning the transition to 
democracy. It argues by implication that false optimism about Kenya and other transition 
economies has two causes. First, scholars and policy makers often have focused on the 
formal aspects of institutions such as parties, parliament, administrative structures, and 
elections rather than on the incentive systems guiding the behavior of political actors in those 
institutions. This has led to overly positive views about how institutions both in and outside 
government actually function, and false enthusiasm about the future. Second, concentrating 
on the formal nature of institutions as sui generis entities also has meant neglecting how 
these institutions actually operate: in this case a deliberate hollowing out of formal 
institutions by those in power in the face of a diffusion of violence over more than a 
generation. 
                                                
3 The author mentioned this during visits to Kenya in 2005 and 2006, in discussions with individuals in 
government and with donors. 
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The conclusions reached in this study of Kenya are of interest for three reasons:  
1. In many democracies, from Bangladesh, to the Philippines, to Kenya, politicians 
depend on violence to build electoral influence. The role of violence in democratic electoral 
competition is largely unexplored in the literature. This study does not examine the still open 
question of when violence becomes important and when it does not, but it does document the 
long term consequences for democratic sustainability. 
2. Policy makers and academics have advocated formal institutional reform (e.g., 
decentralization, proportional representation, and strengthened parliaments) as a solution to 
political violence. The analysis here suggests that violence is not purely a social phenomenon 
in need of being re-channeled through different types of formal institutional vehicles of 
political competition and decision making. Instead, violence is in part a product of political 
competition itself and for that reason may threaten the sustainability of any institutional 
reform that is devised to control violence. Furthermore, as the discussion below makes clear, 
institutional innovation that attempts to graft formal technical changes on to old systems will 
be undermined by prevailing norms and will not work.  
3. The civil conflict literature has focused on conflict triggers ranging from greed to 
grievance, and on both the macro causes (poverty) and the micro causes (the ability of rebels 
to finance insurgency) of violence. Elections are usually taken at face value in the literature 
and democracies are not distinguished according to the quality or specific dynamics of 
electoral competition. The violence in Kenya suggests this is a mistake. Although all the 
major drivers of conflict are present (e.g., historic and significant inter-ethnic conflict over 
land), a key driver here has been the deliberate use of violence for electoral advantage and to 
maintain power indefinitely if possible. This is important because of its potential to destroy 
the integrity of the state itself, as is clear from what follows. 
Diffused Violence 
“Government has lost control of some of this country” (Nation, 1/28/08). 
“Gangs are driving the political agenda” (Nation, 2/6/08). 
For Max Weber,4 the defining characteristic of a state is its ability “to control the monopoly 
of legitimate force over a given territory.” Without this monopoly a state cannot maintain 
order, ensure peace and security, or govern effectively. It thereby risks descending into a 
Hobbesian state of nature. Hence, for Weber this characteristic of the state is essential. 
For a variety of reasons to be discussed below, the state under President Moi, while 
exercising a draconian level of violence against those opposed to it, also manufactured 
institutionalized violence outside of the state, both by design and neglect. Over time, these 
sources of violence, some of which were generated by the state itself to increase its power, 
began to take on a life of their own and were no longer controlled by the state. It is in this 
sense that the state slowly began to cede or abnegate its monopoly. Hence, even when there 
was no crisis, the violence that the Moi state had generated was there to explode with or 
                                                
4 Max Weber, Basic Concepts in Sociology, edited by Talcott Parsons. Seacauscus, N.J.: Citadel Press, 
1985. 
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without its blessing. When Kibaki took over government in 2002, extra-state violence had 
not been checked, had trickled down into the general population, was out of control, and was 
ready to be tapped on call in a variety of ways, as it was after the 2007 election. 
The discussion which follows examines four types of extra-state violence that 
emerged under the Moi regime: that of politicians having their own bodyguards and goon 
squads; the emergence of groups of young thugs which were organized and used by the state 
and its politicians to kill and displace opposition supporters in the Rift Valley, the Coast, and 
other provinces prior to two multiparty elections in the 1990s; the resulting “Mafioso” 
violent shakedown gangs that began to emerge and operate as shadow states in Nairobi’s 
slums, in other cities, and in the countryside, as well as in support of certain politicians; and 
the generalized level of crime and violence that trickled down to confront ordinary citizens 
from the 1980s onward and has continued to do so ever since.  
The Kenyatta period was not without violence. However, most of it—including the 
assassination of three politicians, the use of the provincial administration and preventive 
detention laws to repress opposition politics, and the harnessing of regular and paramilitary 
security forces to disrupt student and political rallies—was controlled by the state.5 Although 
some writings on this period mention the role of the Kenya African National Union (KANU) 
party youth wingers,6 their role was relatively minor, did not threaten the state’s authority, 
and did not come up in discussions with the Kenya People’s Union (KPU) party and other 
opposition supporters concerning repression. Their negative experiences came mainly from 
the state itself and those who discriminated against them out of fear of being associated with 
the opposition.7  
The Moi era was infinitely more repressive than that of Kenyatta, with some authors 
describing Moi’s rule as an “imperial presidency.” Throup8 argues that after independence 
Kenyatta had a good deal of patronage he could use to consolidate support, in contrast to 
Moi. Kenyatta’s supporters received jobs in the civil service and land, both of which had 
opened up with the exit of settlers, and benefited from a coffee boom that generated revenue 
for the state and prosperity for Kenya’s many farmers. In contrast, by the time Moi took over, 
none of the above handouts were available. In addition, coffee prices had plummeted while 
the cost of oil had gone up. Moi also faced recalcitrant Kikuyu elites who had tried to 
                                                
5 Susanne Mueller, “Government and Opposition in Kenya, 1966–1969,” Journal of Modern African 
Studies 22, 3 (1984), 399–427; and S. Mueller, Political Parties in Kenya: Patterns of Opposition and Dissent: 
1919–1969. Ph.D. thesis, Princeton University, Princeton New Jersey, 1972. Also see Daniel Branch and Nic 
Cheeseman, “The Politics of Control in Kenya: Understanding the Bureaucratic Executive State, 1952–78,” 
Review of African Political Economy 107 (2006), 11–28.  
6 Mshai Mwangola “Leaders of Tomorrow: The Youth and Democratisation in Kenya.” In Kenya: 
Struggle for Democracy, edited by Godwin R. Murunga and Shadrack W. Nasong’o. London: Zed Books, 2007, 
147–48. 
7 Mueller, “Government and Opposition in Kenya, 407–26; and Mueller, Political Parties in Kenya. 
8 David W. Throup, “The Construction and Destruction of the Kenyatta State.” In The Political Economy 
of Kenya, edited by Michael Schatzberg. New York: Praeger, 1987, 34–36, 57–73. 
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overthrow him before he took office, Kalenjin supporters who wanted to “eat,” and a 
growing population waiting for perks.  
Unlike Kenyatta, who could give without taking away, Moi had to take away before 
he could give. Hence, the means Moi used both to consolidate support and control those 
opposed to him were cruder and more repressive.9 This entailed “destroy[ing] Kikuyu 
hegemony and dismantl[ing] the economic foundations of the Kenyatta state”10 to “build 
Kalenjin privileges into the structure of the state.”11 This was important because controlling 
the state was the means to entrench an ethnically defined class and to ensure its enrichment. 
Moi’s methods were to tax and destroy Kikuyu agricultural associations; to fill the civil 
service, parastatals, and the university with unqualified individuals from his own ethnic 
group; and to replace the elected Nairobi City Council with an appointed Commission to 
undermine Kikuyu control of the city.12 He also plundered the treasury, in part to support a 
constantly changing inner circle, in contrast to that of Kenyatta, which was more stable.13  
All of this gave rise to outrage in some quarters. Moi, in turn, responded by having 
his critics and even their friends followed, detained, tortured, and killed. He used 
indiscriminate violence against ordinary citizens, particularly against the poor and 
defenseless.14 He and his politicians also began to use extra-state violence early on, possibly 
initially as a prophylactic antidote to the formal security forces, whose loyalties may have 
                                                
9 Throup, “The Construction and Destruction of the Kenyatta State,” 34–36, 57–73; D. Throup and C. 
Hornsby, Multi-Party Democracy in Kenya: The Kenyatta and Moi States and the Triumph of the System. 
Oxford: James Currey, 1998.; C. Odhiambo-Mbai, “The Rise and Fall of the Autocratic State in Kenya.” Edited 
by Walter Oyugi et al. in The Politics of Transition in Kenya: From KANU to NARC. Nairobi: Heinrich Boll 
Foundation, 2003, 51–95. 
10 Michael Chege, “The Return of Multi-Party Politics.” In Beyond Capitalism vs. Socialism in Kenya and 
Tanzania, edited by Joel Barkan. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1994, 46–74. Barkan also notes that 
expenditures for roads, water, agricultural services, and education “shifted away from Central Province” to the 
wheat growing areas of Moi’s supporters in the Rift Valley, with many higher level civil servants from 
Kenyatta’s time losing their jobs. See J. Barkan, “Divergence and Convergence in Kenya and Tanzania.” In 
Beyond Capitalism vs. Socialism in Kenya and Tanzania, edited by Joel Barkan, 1–45. Boulder, Colorado: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994. 
11 Michael Cowen and Karuti Kanyinga, “The 1997 Elections in Kenya: The Politics of Communality and 
Locality.” In Multi-Party Elections in Africa, edited by Michael Cowen and Liisa Laasko. Oxford: James 
Currey, 2002, 128–71. 
12 Richard Stren, Mohammed Halfani, and Joyce Malombe, “Coping with Urbanization and Urban 
Policy.” In Beyond Capitalism vs. Socialism in Kenya and Tanzania. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1994, 
175–200. 
13 Barkan, “Divergence and Convergence,” 27. 
14 Katumanga, “A City Under Siege;” Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC).  Where Terror Rules: 
Torture By Kenyan Police in North Eastern Province. Nairobi: KNCHR, 1998, 1–26; Article 19, Deadly 
Marionettes: State Sponsored Violence in Africa. London: Article 19, International Center Against Censorship, 
2007, 15–25. 
6     Susanne D. Mueller 
 
been in question, a tendency that increased during his twenty-four-year rule. Ironically, the 
more extra-state violence was used to consolidate Moi’s rule, the greater was its potential to 
erode the state’s monopoly of legitimate force. 
The Privatization of Public Violence and Bodyguards 
Even in the early and mid-1980s, politicians such as Nicholas Biwott, William Ntimama, and 
others had personal bodyguards and gangs of supporters,15 something rarely experienced 
during the Kenyatta period. The meting out of private justice through personal gangs was 
something opposition politicians and their supporters experienced as the Moi regime became 
more entrenched and more violent. This was the beginning of what Katamunga aptly has 
called “the privatization of public violence,”16 when the state both invoked extra-legal forces 
to retain power and became criminalized itself. This period, particularly after Kenya became 
a “de jure” one party state in 1982, also coincided with a “revival of the KANU Youth 
Wing,” a tool used “to monitor, silence, and even punish dissidents, usually the lumpens in 
urban and rural Kenya.”17  
Multiparty Democracy and Privatized Extra-State Violence 
The great leap forward in the privatization of violence came in 1991 when the legislation that 
had turned Kenya from a de facto one party state in 1969 into a de jure one in 1982 finally 
was repealed following pressure from internal critics and financial sanctions from donors. 
After this, the Moi regime was faced with the prospect of multiparty elections for the first 
time in twenty-two years. Moi’s thoughts on multipartyism were well known: he detested the 
idea and wanted to stay in power.18 His means were to use hired gangs to displace and kill 
those opposed to him in key electoral areas. Dead and displaced people don’t vote. These 
groups and gangs were composed of young unemployed males and were recruited and hired 
by key KANU politicians, who wanted to win at any cost.19 
The new rules on elections, designed to appeal to the marginalized areas, necessitated 
three conditions for winning the presidency: being elected as an MP, obtaining a majority of 
votes, and receiving more than 25% of the votes in five out of Kenya’s eight provinces.  
                                                
15 In 1991, just before the IMF arrived to announce an end to budget support, a politician came to Nairobi, 
stayed at the 680 Hotel with a group of Masai “warriors,” and allegedly had them go on to deface the Central 
Bank with paint to welcome the IMF. 
16 Katumanga, “A City Under Siege,” 505, 508. 
17 Peter Mwangi Kangwanja, “Clash of Generations? Youth, Identity, Violence, and the Politics of 
Transition in Kenya,” in Jon Abbink and Ineke Van Kessel, eds., Vanguard or Vandals: Youth, Politics, and 
Conflict in Africa (Leiden and Boston, 2004), 90.  
18 Daniel T. arap Moi, Kenya African Nationalism. London: Macmillan, 1986, 174–83. 
19 Patrick O. Asingo, “The Political Economy of Transition in Kenya.” In Politics of Transition in Kenya: 
From Kenya to NARC. Edited by Walter O. Oyugi, Peter Wanyande, and C. Odhiambo-Mbai. Nairobi: Heinrich 
Boll Foundation, 2003, 37–38; David Anderson, “Vigilantes, Violence, and the Politics of Public Order in 
Kenya,” African Affairs 101, no. 405 (2002), 531–55.  
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The glue that kept Moi in power for twenty-four years was a mixture of repression 
and anti-Kikuyuism. He used the latter to consolidate support among his own and other 
marginal ethnic groups in the Rift Valley and elsewhere. As Anderson has noted, “[u]nder 
Moi, KANU bec[a]me KADU reborn.”20 This revived coalition, known by the acronym 
KAMATUSA,21 also appealed to other marginal ethnic groups at the Coast and elsewhere. 
At independence they had opted for the opposition party, the Kenya African Democratic 
Union (KADU); for a federal system known as majimboism; and for a regional constitutional 
arrangement.22 They were worried about being dominated by Kikuyu and other “upcountry” 
groups, as well as the latter’s monopoly over jobs and their acquisition of land outside their 
“home” areas. KADU nevertheless folded and joined the governing KANU party in 1964, 
just one year after independence. In part, this was because majimboism had been so diluted in 
various constitutional conferences that it had become economically and politically unviable. 
Hence, KADU MPs slowly gave up and crossed the floor.23 Kenyatta also soothed the pain; 
he enticed the top echelon of the party with ministerial appointments, parastatal and other 
jobs, and access to choice land in the Rift Valley.24 When asked later why he and his cohorts 
had never tried to bring back majimboism with a constitutional amendment from 1978–1990 
when they controlled government, William Ntimama (the MP for Narok and a minister in 
Moi’s cabinet) answered, “Power is sweet.”25  
However, even afterwards, these same past issues continued to be salient for ex-
KADU ethnic groups, who thus found Moi’s anti-Kikuyuism appealing. Population pressures 
in the Rift, the relative poverty of ordinary pastoralists as compared to agriculturalists, and 
land scarcities26 continued to increase. Pressures on the land were rising, jobs were in scarce 
                                                
20 Anderson, “‘Yours in the Struggle of Majimbo’ : Nationalism and the Party Politics of Decolonization 
in Kenya,” Journal of Contemporary History 40, 3 (2005), 563. For further elaboration of this point see D. 
Anderson, “Décline et Chute de la KANU: Politique Partisane et Succession de Moi (Kenya),” Politique 
Africaine, no. 90 (June 2003), 37–55. See Ngunyi, who makes a similar point discussing both “majimboism” 
and “neo-majimboism.” Mutahi Ngunyi, “Resuscitating the ‘Majimbo Projects’: The Politics of Deconstructing 
the Unity State in Kenya.” In Challenges to the Nation State in Africa, edited by Adebayo O. Olukoshi and 
Liisa Laaska. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1996,183–213. Also see K. Kanyinga, “Contestation over 
Political Space: The State and Demobilization of Party Politics in Kenya.” CDR Working Paper 98/12. 
Copenhagen: Center for Development Research (CDR), November 1998. 
21 The acronym KAMATUSA is a short hand for Kalenjin, Masai, Samburu, and Turkana. 
22 Anderson, “‘Yours in the Struggle of Majimbo,’” 552–53, 555. 
23 Ibid., 561–63. 
24 Robert Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in 
Kenya. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, 61–63; Jennifer A. Widner, The Rise of a Party State in 
Kenya. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1992, 53- 55.  
25 Quoted in “Is Majimbo Federalism” in The Nation, 20 May 2001. 
26 David S. Wilcove, No Way Home: The Decline of the World’s Great Animal Migrations. Washington, 
D.C.: Shearwater Books, Center for Resource Economics, 2008. Wilcove’s excellent study notes that in the 
Masai Mara, the rate of population increase is 4 percent a year, leading to a doubling of the population every 
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supply, and many individuals in these areas were illiterate. All of this combined to feed 
already existing feelings of resentment of outsiders and marginalization. Many “outsiders” in 
fact were long term residents who had lived in parts of the Rift and elsewhere for over thirty 
to forty years. In addition, a number of contentious land issues arose as a result of local elites 
grabbing land illegally from their own poor co-ethnics through their control of local land 
committees and their influence over the provincial administration.27 Hence, mobilizing 
resentment against outsiders over land dovetailed with the self-interest of local elites and 
with efforts to ensure Moi’s political survival after 1991.  
Faced with a new multi-party situation and new rules for elections, Moi and his 
entourage were determined to win at any price. He was particularly worried about the 
demographics of the Rift, with its increasing influx of Kikuyu, as well as Luhya and Luo. 
Moi feared that their vote for upcountry opposition politicians running for president might 
keep him from obtaining 25% of the ballots cast, which he needed to win the Rift Valley 
Province. He also worried about losing seats to opposition politicians elsewhere, something 
that potentially could eat away at his parliamentary majority. 
Politicians in multiparty democracies always face the possibility of losing elections. 
They have two options: to appeal to potential constituents and try to wean them away from 
the opposition or to get rid of the opposition itself. One way of eliminating a defined group of 
opposition opponents is to gerrymander them out of a district. Another method, used by 
James Curley, the corrupt Irish Catholic major of Boston, was to get his Protestant Brahmin 
opponents (whom he referred to as “an inferior race”) to move out of Boston entirely and into 
the suburbs, thereby eliminating their votes in the city. Curley’s means were to allow their 
section of the city fall apart, and direct all public works, infrastructure, and new jobs to his 
Irish Catholic base. His strategy worked and Curley managed to stay in power for over forty 
years. This happened even though Curley’s redistributive methods led to both Boston and his 
own constituents being worse off than when the well to do Brahmins were still living there 
and contributing revenue to Boston’s tax base. Economists Glaeser and Schleifer have named 
this syndrome “the Curley Effect”: doing whatever is necessary to increase the size of one’s 
political base to retain power through “distortionary wealth reducing policies,” even if it 
leaves your supporters worse off than before.28 This argues against more conventional 
theories, which assume politicians need to curry favor with constituents to get reelected or 
                                                                                                                                                  
eighteen years. Also, inoculations against rinderpest disease have increased the number of animals at the same 
time as the land for pastoralists has decreased. One reason is that agriculturalists earn many times more per 
hectare than pastoralists (e.g., $50–$100 per acre as compared to $5–$13 per acre), something that has led to an 
increase in settled agriculturalists and a constriction of grazing land for pastoralists. 
27 Esther Mwangi, “Subdividing the Commons: Distributional Conflict in the Transition from Collective 
to Individual Property Rights in Kenya’s Masailand,” World Development 5, 5 (2007), 815–34. 
28 Edward L. Glaeser, and Andrei Schleifer, “The Curley Effect: The Economics of Shaping the 
Electorate,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 21, 1 (April 2005), 1–19. 
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they will be thrown out of office, and against those who argue that multipartyism thereby 
induces sounder economic policies.29  
Moi’s use of violence outside the state, in a parody of Von Clausewitz’s statement on 
war, might be called gerrymandering or Curleyism by more drastic means. The means 
employed by Moi in both the 1991 and 1997 multiparty elections were violent attacks on his 
political opponents in the Rift Valley and elsewhere, literally designed to eliminate them. He 
used privatized violence or gangs. In most cases these gangs were formed, aided, or abetted 
by the state’s security apparatus and the provincial administration. Gangs of youth were 
organized by key KANU politicians who were identified by name in both human rights’ 
reports and those produced by a government commission. In the 1992 election, these tactics 
in the Rift and elsewhere led to the killing of over 1,500 individuals and the displacement of 
over 300,000 others, most of whom were Kikuyu. Consequently, they were not able to 
vote.30 This included 15,000 voters who were pushed out of Narok, when the Masai MP 
William Ntimama used the right of eminent domain to reclaim the land and evict inhabitants 
who might vote against him. Before the election Ntimama had told the Kikuyu to “lie low 
like envelopes,”31 and other politicians were equally virulent in their warnings. 
Later, in 1997, government again used similar tactics. In both cases, coded hate 
messages were used at rallies, including discussions of majimboism. As judge Akiwumi (who 
later conducted an inquiry into the “tribal clashes” of the 1990s in the Rift Valley, Western, 
Coast, and Northeastern Provinces) noted with respect to the Rift:  
Majimbo according to the evidence presented to us was not federalism in the real 
sense of the word, but an arrangement in which each community would be required to 
return to its ancestral district or province and if for any reason they would be reluctant 
or unwilling to do so, they would by all means be forced to do so.32  
                                                
29 See Bates’s discussion of this point and why multiparty elections may not induce better economic 
behavior if politicians feel at risk, are not subject to political accountability, and end up distorting the economy 
rather than providing more public goods. R.H. Bates, “Institutions and Development,” Journal of African 
Economics 15, Supplement 1 (2006), 10–61. 
30 Africa Watch. Divide and Rule: State-Sponsored Ethnic Violence in Kenya. New York: Human Rights 
Watch, 1992, 70–72, 79–80; KHRC, Kayas of Deprivation, Kayas of Blood: Violence, Ethnicity and the State in 
Coastal Kenya. Nairobi: KNCHR, 1997, 48–49; KHRC, Kayas Revisited: A Post Election Balance Sheet. 
Nairobi: KNCHR, 1998, 38–47. For chilling accounts of the displacement and killing of individuals in the Rift 
Valley, Western, North East, Eastern, and Coast Provinces before the 1992 and 1997 elections, see the 
government’s own inquiry into the clashes in Republic of Kenya (ROK), The Commission of Inquiry Act (Cap. 
102), Report of the Judicial Commission Appointed to Inquire Into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Report). 
Nairobi: Government Printer, 31 July 1999. 
31 Africa Watch, Divide and Rule, 30. 
32 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Judicial Commission, 78. 
10     Susanne D. Mueller 
 
According to Boone, they were. The total combined fallout from the two elections in the 
1990s was 2,000 people killed, 500,000 displaced, and others intimidated into not voting.33 
Even after the 1992 election, Africa Watch argued the political landscape of the Rift had 
been permanently altered. Boone confirms this, noting that 70% of those who had been 
pushed off their land in the 1990s had not returned by 2002.34 For Moi, this was operation 
accomplished. 
Those who participated in the violence (and who in many cases were dressed as 
warriors) were paid according to whether they destroyed huts, permanent structures, or had 
killed people.35 Some were promised land, but one testimony to the Akiwumi Commission 
claims they did not get it.36 Another report by the Jesuit Refugee Service of East Africa 
argues that “land was allocated to the corrupt,”37 while Africa Watch notes some land was 
bought at “sums below market prices” or was “illegally occupied by squatters.”38 Boone 
notes that land was given as patronage to reward “supporters … party militants, local 
officials, and unemployed youth.” However, the extent to which this happened is not clear.39 
One knows both from government’s inquiry into the clashes and from human rights 
organizations that perpetrators were paid according to the tasks carried out: more for 
destroying fixed structures and more for killing than for just participating or burning huts. 
However, there appears to be no systematic information about whether those who killed and 
destroyed the property of Kikuyu and other upcountry inhabitants in the Rift and other 
marginal areas were forcibly impressed into service, motivated by long standing grievances, 
by pay, by prospects of land, or by other perks. This is an unfortunate gap in our 
understanding of what happened and why. Nevertheless, Kamungi argues that one important 
side effect of the clashes, particularly in Northern Kenya, was an “arms race” and a general 
“militarization of society” as individuals increasingly felt a need to defend themselves when 
government did not.40 
Although there is some disagreement on the subject, a good deal of the statistical 
work in the political economy literature on conflict argues persuasively that conflict, 
                                                
33 Catherine Boone, “Winning and Losing Politically Allocated Land Rights,” Unpublished paper for the 
African Studies Association Meetings, New York, 2007, p. 9.  
34 Ibid., p. 20. Others argue that those who were displaced returned and there was not a huge reallocation 
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35 Africa Watch, Divide and Rule, 52. 
36 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Judicial Commission, 88. There is no information or systematic study 
of what percentage of those who were displaced eventually came back, and who got or bought the land of those 
who did not return.  
37 Kamungi, “The Current Situation of Internally Displaced Persons in Kenya.” Unpublished Report, 
Jesuit Refugee Service (EA), March 2001, 11–12, 23.  
38 Africa Watch, Divide and Rule, 70,77, 2. 
39 Boone, “Winning and Losing,” 19. 
40 Kamungi, “The Current Situation,” 13, 15. 
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particularly civil war, is driven mainly by greed rather than grievance.41 From the standpoint 
of the elite, many of whom already owned large tracts of land in the Rift and elsewhere, 
greed for political power, both by MPs from the area and by President Moi, appears to have 
been the motivating factor in the face of multi-party elections. Grievance over the dominance 
of land and jobs by upcountry individuals in the marginal areas was long standing. However, 
one needs to explain why, after living side by side for many decades, extra-state violence was 
employed systematically only with the reintroduction of multiparty elections, and why it 
became an attack by the indigenous poor on upcountry voters rather than on the indigenous 
landed elite.42 In the case of the actual perpetrators, the motives are less clear. At the Coast, 
Digo youth who invaded the Likoni Police Station to obtain arms for use in attacks on 
inhabitants from upcountry43 were organized by local politicians. However, they were also 
reacting against their long standing harassment by non-coastal government officers who 
occupied the police and administrative apparatus. 
The result of all this is that the state aided and abetted the ability of non-state groups 
to perpetrate violence, and these non-state actors continued to exist even after the elections, 
as they were never punished. Hence, “privatized violence” was there to be used again for 
similar or different purposes, or to act on its own some other day for some other end. Thus, 
the very violence used by the state to achieve its own ends actually acted to squander its 
monopoly of legitimate force for the future. 
Urban Gangs and Mungiki 
During the 1980s and 1990s, urban crime also became a serious problem. The urban poor 
were increasingly harassed by the state, evicted from certain areas, and had some of their 
“jua kali” markets destroyed.44 At the same time, due to the criminalization of the state 
itself, Nairobi’s City Council and later the City Commission began to ignore many of its own 
city ordinances, simultaneously taking over land illegally, constructing buildings while 
bypassing its own regulations concerning safety, and allowing the poor to set up shacks and 
kiosks in areas where they were prohibited. What began as an initial lapse in ethnics in the 
1980s when the new head of Nairobi’s City Commission bought overpriced drapes for his 
                                                
41 Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done about 
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43 KHRC, Kayas of Deprivation; KHRC, Kayas Revisited. 
44 Katumanga, “A City Under Siege,” 513. 
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office in City Hall, soon turned into more flagrant errors of judgment, including an 
unexplained decision to let garbage rot in public areas rather than collecting it.45 As a result 
Nairobi, the “city in the sun,” began to be transformed into an increasingly unattractive city 
of thieves and underworld activities, where ordinary citizens felt threatened and began to see 
their once thriving middle class city decay. Gone were the days when pink and purple 
bougainvilleas adorned Uhuru highway’s center divide. 
It was into this milieu of decay that urban gangs began to appear as significant actors. 
The largest and most prominent of these was “Mungiki,” a gang that began as a Kikuyu cult 
cum religious revival group in Laikipia District in the mid-1980s. Its origin, nature, and 
activities have been discussed and disputed in numerous articles.46 However, its main raison 
d’être from the mid-1990s onward was as a violent, Mafioso style shakedown gang. It 
operated almost as a shadow state in some Nairobi slums, in parts of the countryside, and 
began to control certain businesses, such as matatu minibuses by demanding “protection 
money.” The gang had a known leader, was hierarchically organized like an army or urban 
inner city gangs in the United States, and by the mid-nineties was said to have somewhere 
between 3.5–4 million members.47 The 1990s were a significant point of departure for 
Mungiki, as a number of its members were Kikuyu who had been displaced from the Rift 
Valley by Moi’s ethnic cleansing operations during the multiparty elections of the 1990s. 
Initially, Mungiki claimed some moral authority where it operated by offering 
security, protection, and services in Nairobi’s slums and working class housing estates that 
had been largely abandoned by the state. However, its main import soon became that of a 
well-armed violent gang. It intimidated and demanded payment from citizens, murdered 
those who refused to cough up, settled disputes, and meted out justice in the slums. In some 
areas it became a shadow state, even charging for the use of pit latrine toilets. Mungiki began 
to expand into the “matatu” urban transport arena, vying violently for control over certain 
routes. It also engaged in other business activities, including demanding payments from “jua 
kali” car repairmen working on Kirinyaga road, claimed effective hegemony to govern 
certain areas, and routinely got into wars with gangs, such as the Luo Taliban and others. 
Their wars were usually over turf rather than ethnicity, although the two often coincided, 
something not so surprising given the earlier organization of self help groups along ethnic 
                                                
45 Cowen and Kanyinga argue that Moi’s primary accumulation through the state and the resulting 
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46 See Anderson and citations in his article “Vigilantes, Violence, and the Politics of Public Order,” 531–
55; Peter M. Kagwanja, “Facing Mount Kenya or Facing Mecca? The Mungiki Ethnic Violence and the Politics 
of the Moi Succession,” African Affairs 102, 406 (January 2003), 25–49; P.M. Kagwanja “‘Power to Uhuru’: 
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lines. For instance, in one case the Luo Taliban attacked Kikuyu slumlords for raising rents 
in Kibera, which invited counterattacks by Mungiki, which was Kikuyu.48 However, 
Mungiki did not discriminate and was equally virulent in its attacks against other Kikuyu in 
Nairobi, Central Province, and elsewhere. 
Various authors have suggested that Mungiki received guns from and was aided by 
state security forces. The main point as made by Gecaga is that notwithstanding its origins, 
Mungiki evolved into a classic capitalist operation. It was a gang for hire. It operated on a 
willing buyer willing seller basis, anxious to sell its services “to the highest bidder.”49 That 
explains its interaction with security forces that it initially claimed to detest, as well as its 
alleged willingness to support a myriad of politicians, ranging from some in Kenneth 
Matiba’s FORD-Asili party to Moi’s KANU, and his candidate for president in 2002, Uhuru 
Kenyatta. The latter seems odd given that some Mungiki members were originally displaced 
from the Rift Valley by Moi in the 1990s. This decision seems less odd, however, when one 
considers that in exchange for supporting Moi, Mungiki then was “allowed to take over 
certain transport routes”.50 
In extorting from poor as well as rich Mungiki members, at least those at the top, 
were doing very well financially from their criminal activities. As Katumanga estimates, the 
annual value of the “bandit economy” (including resale of cars that were high jacked and 
resold in 2004) was about $3.8 million a year, while the subscriptions Mungiki raised from 
its members were around $58,000 per month as early as the mid-nineties.51 This information 
also tends to support both Collier’s argument about greed rather than grievance being the 
motivating factor in conflict52 as well as the upwardly mobile material motivations of 
hierarchically organized gangs, as discussed by Levitt and Dubner in their chapter on why 
drug dealers in the south side of Chicago tend to live with their mothers.53 
When Kibaki took power in 2002 he banned Mungiki. As recently as 2007, after 
Mungiki beheaded certain matatu drivers who refused to be shaken down, the then Minister 
of Security, John Michuki, went after Mungiki with a shoot to kill policy. However, Mungiki 
still continued to operate, available for business and for hire. 
The main point from the perspective of this paper is that long before the 2007 
election, Mungiki had become a virtual shadow state in certain areas. While reputedly 
sometimes used by the state and its politicians from Moi onwards, it nevertheless also 
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operated outside state control. As such, it reduced the state’s monopoly of legitimate force, 
which by the time of the 2007 election had been severely compromised. 
Gangs and Politicians 
While Mungiki may be the largest and the most written about gang for hire in Kenya, there 
were others that also frittered away at the state’s monopoly of legitimate force. Their names 
alone were provocative: Kamjeshi, Baghdad Boys, Jeshi la Mzee (the elder’s battalion), Jeshi 
la Embakasi, Kaya Bombo Youth, Chionkororo, Amachuma, The Rwenjes Football Club, the 
Jeshi ya King’ole, Jeshi la Mbela, and others. The gangs operated in various parts of the 
country: Nairobi, Kisumu, Mombasa, Kwale, Taita Taveta, rural Kisii, Ukambani, Murang’a, 
and elsewhere.54 
These gangs had various functions: shakedown gangs engaged in survival; gangs 
defending themselves from violence by the state security forces; gangs used to disrupt 
opposition rallies; gangs organized to support state politicians afraid of the opposition, and 
vice versa.55 The main point is that politics by other means had taken root all over the 
country while various gangs both appeared and disappeared. All of this was a further sign 
that the state’s monopoly of legitimate force was being challenged and being frittered away. 
This diffusion of violence supports Bates’s observation that “the shift to competitive 
politics appears to heighten the level of political disorder.” Elites fear losing power and lose 
incentives to “refrain from predation,” while citizens “anticipate” this and “prepare to defend 
themselves.”56  
Trickle Down Violence 
There also were trickle down effects from the diffused violence that emanated from formal 
gangs. Freelancers operated too, and there was a demonstration effect arising from the 
general diffused violence that had plagued Kenya for so long. Ordinary citizens were 
constantly plagued by violence in their daily lives. Their vehicles were carjacked; their 
houses were invaded; and they often were robbed, duct taped, or raped in their apartments. 
Their friends were murdered in their homes, on their way to church, or while waiting for a 
guard to open their gates. Certain parts of Nairobi and even certain routes into the 
countryside became no-go areas. Everyone from every class was touched by violence, 
although those in poor housing estates and in certain rural areas experienced the worst of it. 
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By the time of the 2007 election, the majority of Kenyans faced these conditions. In 
contrast to the Moi period when their major fear was the heavy hand of the state, they now 
had to worry about gang violence, free lance violence, and everything connected with both. 
A recent survey indicated that only 16% of all respondents did not fear violence and that 30% 
had been threatened by politicians.57 What began as an attempt by Moi and his entourage to 
ensure their hegemony and win elections had escalated so severely that the state was in 
jeopardy of losing its monopoly of legitimate force. Violence was biding its time in the 
corridors of Nairobi and the countryside, waiting to explode when and if it was tapped. It was 
tapped and did explode after the 2007 election results were announced amidst cries of 
rigging. The explosion was not so surprising, given the way in which the state ironically had 
frittered away its monopoly of force while trying to add to it. 
Deliberately Weak Institutions 
“A nation state is failed when its institutions no longer work” (Nation, 1/26/08). 
“[There is] a failure of our institutions to come up with results that are auditable and 
verifiable” (East African Standard, 1/28/08). 
One of the hallmarks of democracy is its system of checks and balances among the executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches of government. Douglas North argues that government, as 
well as other organizations, operates according to “rules of the game” that determine how it 
actually works. Formal rules of the game are laid down in written constitutions, laws, and 
organizational directives. Informal rules of the game consist of unwritten norms that are 
enforced through often unspoken sanctions and rewards. Both, but particularly informal rules 
of the game, tend to support the status quo and the interests of the actors that it serves. This is 
why attempts to transpose systems from one part of the world to another usually do not work; 
old norms undermine new systems.58 
In Kenya, since independence, the formal rules of the game have been changed 
deliberately over time to buttress a strong executive branch at the expense of other parts of 
government. The informal norms increasingly have undermined even these changed formal 
rules by trumping the autonomy of independent branches of government in favor of a highly 
personalized and increasingly powerful presidency. Hence, the autonomy of institutions 
outside the presidency has suffered.  
The argument here is that this phenomenon of deliberately weak autonomous 
institutions outside the presidency was a precipitating factor in explaining why Kenya 
imploded after the 2007 election. When both internal and external election observers 
challenged the legitimacy of the election on numerous counts, the question arose as to how 
these challenges could be dealt with and resolved within the framework of existing 
institutions. Unfortunately, there were no good answers.  
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Parties to the election as well as citizens did not believe that the Electoral 
Commission of Kenya (ECK) was independent59 from the executive branch of government 
and felt that the announced results had been doctored either there or in the field. Less than 
two months before the election, President Kibaki replaced all of the ECK’s commissioners, 
simultaneously appointing his former lawyer as the ECK’s Vice Chairman. This violated an 
informal agreement from 1997 that all parties would have a say in appointing commissioners 
to the ECK.60 Also, in contrast to past practices, commissioners were now responsible for 
overseeing election results in their own provinces as well as hiring returning officers, who in 
turn owed them loyalty. Overall, this dissipated confidence in the ECK.61  
Furthermore, there was a huge outcry when the Attorney General said that disputes 
over the results should be resolved in the courts. The reason was that on important issues, 
Kenya’s judiciary is viewed as partisan rather than impartial and as tied to the executive 
branch rather than independent from it. This has been a long-standing problem, but was 
exacerbated in the run up to the election when a new bill created fifty-seven judicial 
vacancies in the high court and seventeen others in the court of appeals.62 
Hence, the argument over who won the presidency took to the streets after the ECK 
announced the election results. The crisis sparked by contested results ignited this second 
underlying precipitating factor: that of deliberately weak institutions. Again, it might not 
have come to this had the election not been so close, and had there not been allegations of 
riggings. But it did, in the face of elections that were too close to call beforehand and 
contested afterwards. 
The Executive Presidency  
From the standpoint of formal rules, the history of the presidency has been one of increasing 
personalized power at the center. Odiambo-Mbai notes that after passing a constitutional 
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amendment in 1964 that made Kenyatta both head of state and head of government, KANU 
put through nine other amendments by 1968 that increased the power of the executive at the 
expense of other organs of government. During this period federalism was abolished, the 
opposition parties at independence folded, KANU became an arm of the state, and the 
influence of local authorities was denuded.63 These amendments included the notorious 
preventive detention act. As early as 1970, “the powers of government revolved exclusively 
around Kenyatta” and Leys referred to his home as a “court.”64 At the same time, parliament 
became little more than a rubber stamp for the executive. 
In terms of the formal rules of the game, opposition parties were legal and were 
allowed until an amendment to the constitution in 1982 prohibited them. However, those who 
joined the opposition KPU in 1966 were punished when they crossed the floor; they lost jobs, 
parastatal appointments, and were harassed.65 Those who came back to the fold were in turn 
rewarded. These were the well known informal rules of the game, which everyone 
understood. As Kenyatta himself said at the time when he went to GEM constituency in 
Nyanza in an attempt to wean back the opposition, “Kenyatta has the sugar,… go lick his 
hands.”66 Most did. 
Under President Moi, numerous other amendments to the constitution were passed, 
including Section 2A of the constitution that turned Kenya into a de jure one party state in 
1982. By 1991, the constitution had been amended approximately thirty-two times. Although 
Section 2A was removed in 1991, the other clauses pertaining to “personal rule” were “left 
intact.”67 In addition, Moi erased distinctions between party and state, took away the lifetime 
security of tenure of the attorney general, solicitor general, and judges, and introduced queue 
voting for elections in 1988.68  
As Gimonde notes, Moi’s rules, both formal and informal, created a “culture of fear,” 
there was a “breakdown of constitutional checks and balances,” and the judiciary became an 
appendage of the executive.69 For advocates who did not conform to this breakdown, the 
penalties were draconian: torture, detentions without trial, and an attempt to kill a human 
rights lawyer in his home by lighting his downstairs drapes on fire while he and his family 
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slept. No part of government was left untouched. Even vehicles from the parastatal electricity 
company Kenya Power and Lighting (KPL) and the Kenya Posts and Telecommunications 
Company (KPTC) were used in surveillance: to follow suspects; to harass them; and to enter 
their premises under false pretences, often when they were not at home. It was not possible to 
speak of institutional integrity or adherence to formal rules when government at the behest of 
the president worked to destroy both. Civil servants from earlier times were utterly 
demoralized, but too powerless and afraid to do anything. 
Furthermore, as discussed earlier, Moi ruled more crudely than Kenyatta. Having no 
“fruits of uhuru” he could use to reward his supporters, he plundered the state instead, 
relying on it more heavily than Kenyatta as “an arena for the primary accumulation of capital 
and to retain political support.”70 By definition, the combination of looting the state and 
abandoning rules meant entrenching corruption. As Odhiambo-Mbai notes, there was so little 
regard for the formal rules of the system that Moi often issued decrees that were followed 
even though they violated the constitution and sometimes even reversed his own cabinet’s 
decisions.71 
Returning to the perversion of the judiciary and the formal rules of other parts of 
government under Moi, it is possible to understand the norms of the informal system and the 
sanctions and rewards that enforced them by examining the Akiwumi Report on the “tribal 
clashes” of the 1990s. In hearing testimony from various parties, the judge was trying to 
determine why individuals in the provincial administration, the police, and intelligence did 
not protect citizens against the violence and come to their defense in conformity with the 
formal rules under which they were operating, did nothing in the face of intelligence reports 
warning of clashes, or were complicit in them. What he found was that individuals were 
afraid of displeasing their bosses (who supported Moi), were fearful of losing their jobs if 
they challenged the status quo, and were rewarded with promotions if they kept their mouths 
shut and did nothing. In contrast, an advocate who had evidence of the complicity of the 
Provincial Administration in the ethnic clashes in Narok and filed a case, thereby challenging 
the normative rules of the game, was punished as a result. Within hours of going to court his 
house was raided, he was arrested, imprisoned, and charged with having illegal documents. 
While he was later released, the point of the case was to warn others that the price for 
challenging the status quo would be high. This is in fact how the enforcement mechanisms of 
the informal system worked and undermined the already battered formal system.72  
Moi’s rule has aptly been described as an “imperial presidency.” He simply ignored 
the formal rules that got in his way and did what he wanted. Everyone understood the 
informal rules: support the president not the formal rules, or be punished and possibly die. It 
was a very violent, very corrupt, and very dangerous period in Kenya’s history. The formal 
institutions outside the presidency had their autonomy almost totally curtailed, and this was 
deliberate.  
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One of the best descriptions of how this system actually functioned was written by 
Koigi wa Wamwere, a former opposition politician. As he noted as late as 1992 speaking of 
parliament, “[it] is a parliament that is held prisoner by the Executive. It is a Parliament 
under siege. The police roam the corridors, restaurant, galleries and bars of Parliament as if 
Parliament were Special Branch Headquarters.”73 
The almost total abandonment of the rule of law and independent institutional checks 
on a highly personalized presidency, also paved the way for gross corruption during Moi’s 
twenty-four year rule. In the 1980s and 1990s, numerous new banks such as the Trade Bank, 
the Exchange Bank, and others mushroomed. Many were nothing more than front 
organizations designed to loot and cleanse stolen public sector funds. In a living parody of 
medieval times, Moi also held court in his rural home receiving briefcases full of cash from 
visitors, while plying those he wanted to buy off with hard cash,74 something that became 
known as going to “eat ugali” with the president. The full extent of how this lawless system 
actually worked and who benefited from it came to light only later: first in the Goldenberg 
Commission hearings and later in the Kroll report. The latter identified conduits and names, 
putting the value of state funds stolen by Moi, his family, and associates such as Nicholas 
Biwott at $2 billion.75 By this time, corruption had trickled down to all aspects of daily life.  
The Continued Weakness of Autonomous Institutions Post-2002 
Even after the creation of multipartyism in 1991, Asingo argues correctly that those in favor 
of democracy did not “creat[e] strong political institutions, structures, and processes 
supportive of democratic values.”76 Furthermore, rules were often non-existent or ignored, 
particularly when it came to party nominations and election financing.77 
Aclemoglu and Robinson argue that institutional innovation tends to take place 
normally under two conditions: first when a ruling group is entrenched and there is no fear of 
losing from innovation; and second when they face a high degree of competition and not 
making innovations might lead to their replacement.78 When neither of these conditions 
applies, politicians tend to fear institutional innovation. This is because innovation might lead 
to losses of political power and rents. The conditions favoring institutional change do not 
apply in Kenya. Hence, while the political atmosphere and the economy in Kenya greatly 
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improved after the election of the NARC government, it is not surprising that institutions 
outside the presidency continued to be weak and deliberately so. 
A few examples will suffice to demonstrate how large parts of government ignored 
the formal rules of the system, which were essentially paper rules that did not govern actual 
behavior. They also show that while ignoring the formal checks and balances on the 
presidency did not work at one level, at another level the informal rules of the game worked 
very well for those in power. 
Under Moi and Kibaki, there were two major financial scandals: the Goldenberg 
scandal under Moi and the Anglo Leasing scandal under both presidents. One involved the 
fictitious export of non-existent gold to take advantage of an export compensation scheme, 
while the other consisted of air contracts to non-existent foreign companies abroad. Under 
the former, about $1 billion left the Central Bank illegally, while the latter also involved 
several hundred million dollars in transactions, each in part having to do with campaign 
financing. In both cases, the formal rules of the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance 
were suspended and ignored. In one case there was a long commission hearing; in the other 
some ministers were dismissed temporarily and then reinstated. No higher ups were ever 
punished. Both cases involved gross corruption and bypassing all the formal financial 
controls in the system, something that had profoundly detrimental effects on the economy 
and the integrity of the political system. The Anglo Leasing case occurred under the new 
National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) government, a government that had come in on an anti-
corruption platform. 
Even before the public became aware of the Anglo Leasing scandal, which involved a 
number of high-level ministers, Kibaki had hired John Githongo to be his anti-corruption tsar 
in the office of the president. Githongo brought the corruption emanating from the scandal to 
the attention of the president and his inner circle. He was rewarded with threats for having 
betrayed his boss, and eventually fled the country in fear for his life. 
Later in 2007 there was the mysterious case of the so-called “Armenian brothers;” 
two individuals who apparently were not Armenian but were alleged to be closely involved 
with the daughter of President Kibaki and his “second wife,” Mary Wambui79. The 
“Armenians” appeared to be implicated in contraband activities, including drugs, and 
possibly in undercover security operations, although none of this was ever made clear. For 
reasons not entirely obvious, they developed a scam that involved suspending airport security 
and allowing them to pretend to be returning to the country, while carrying guns and clearing 
some imports thought to be contraband. All formal rules governing airport security were 
violated after officials at the airport received a call from the president’s daughter, allowing 
this fictitious reentry to take place. Before the “Armenian” incident, Kibaki’s daughter had 
been “working” in a government ministry where she never appeared. 
Shortly after this scam played out, The East African Standard newspaper was invaded 
and badly damaged by a masked gang, allegedly attempting to prevent the publication of a 
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damaging story about the “Armenian” brothers, what they were doing in Kenya, their links to 
the president’s family, and possibly other matters.80 
In the last year before the election, the president appointed nineteen new 
commissioners to the Electoral Commission of Kenya and three new judges to Kenya’s High 
Court, where contested election appeals would be adjudicated, on the eve of the 2007 
presidential elections.  
In all of the above cases formal rules or laws were ignored, bent, or misused in 
contrast to their original intent. The informal rules rewarded the perpetrators and punished 
those who did not play ball. Aside from further destroying the integrity of the state, the 
malleability of formal rules to accommodate executive and inner circle whims opened the 
door to massive corruption, this time under President Kibaki. 
Given Kenya’s long history of changing formal rules to increase presidential power 
and of undermining the autonomy of other institutions designed to provide for checks and 
balances in favor of informal norms designed to weaken them, Kenya’s contested election 
presented a serious systemic challenge. Institutions such as the Electoral Commission of 
Kenya (ECK) and the courts, which in theory could have dealt with these challenges, were 
not viewed as independent or credible. They were seen as part of the presidency, not as 
separate from it. Suspicions of election rigging were fueled by apparent pressure to announce 
results at the ECK; allegations of vote tampering in the field both at the polling and 
constituency levels; changed numbers on forms; missing forms; ECK officials who could not 
be reached in the field; delays in tallying results and votes reaching Nairobi; as well as 
implausibly high turnouts and significant differences between the presidential and 
parliamentary vote in some areas. Suspicions were further heightened when the head of the 
ECK (under pressure from both domestic and foreign observers) said he himself did not 
know who had won the election (a point he has since reiterated), and when President Kibaki 
secretly was sworn in amidst allegations of rigging and then quickly appointed half of his 
cabinet. Hence, the historic and contemporary problem of deliberately weak and non-
autonomous institutions outside the presidency was sparked by a too close to call, contested 
election. These circumstances pushed the resolution of Kenya’s elections off the table and 
into the streets. 
Non-Programmatic Clientist Political Parties 
“We failed to develop democratic struggles where opponents do not become enemies” 
(Sunday Nation, 1/27/08). 
“The only time government and opposition agree is when they want to fatten their pay 
checks” (Nation, 1/22/08). 
The third underlying precipitating factor ignited by the contested 2007 election was non-
programmatic clientist parties based on ethnicity. Although Kenya has many ethnic groups 
that have lived side by side for years, politicians polarized and politicized ethnicity 
negatively in the run up to the election. This ignited fears on both sides about what would 
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happen if their parties did not win. When irregularities concerning results raised questions 
that were not resolved, some local opposition politicians and elders apparently organized81 
ethnically driven violence in Eldoret and other parts of the Rift Valley among their 
supporters to protest the results and attack the Kikuyu, who supported Kibaki. Spontaneous 
violence also erupted in Nairobi, Kisumu, and elsewhere. Government responded with a 
shoot to kill policy in Kisumu and Nairobi. Violence continued to escalate and counter 
violence—organized as ethnic retribution by supporters of government in Nakuru and 
Naivasha—also grew until death and destruction engulfed many parts of Kenya. Human 
rights organizations and Western governments maintain that some of this violence was 
organized and orchestrated by politicians and businessmen.82 To understand why they chose 
to tap ethnicity, one must understand more about Kenya politics and its political parties. 
Political Parties  
Kenya’s political parties are not programmatic. Their ideologies, policies, and programs are 
largely indistinguishable and are not seen as particularly salient.83 Politics is viewed 
primarily as a winner-take-all, zero sum ethnic game. The national economic cake is the 
prize. Various ethnic groups argue openly that it is their turn to “eat.”84 The means to this 
end is controlling the state and having a fellow co-ethnic become president. As parties are not 
programmatic and institutions are weak, politicians are seen primarily as personal distributors 
of private rather than public goods.85 Even though alliances and cross ethnic coalitions are 
necessary to win the presidency, the winner is seen by others as the chief ethnic in charge. 
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Hence, the importance of winning and not losing, particularly as political losses have meant 
being excluded from “access to state resources.”86 This historic reality has encouraged what 
Cowen and Kanyinga call a “communal logic” of “tribalism” from above and “below” to 
“access state resources through one of our own because this is the only way to eat.”87 
Kenya politicians obtain power primarily by using ethnic arithmetic and clientage as 
mobilizing factors, whether articulated openly or not. As such, Kenya’s leaders and 
politicians have shifted from party to party and in the process made strange bedfellow 
alliances with each other.88 Even those who are in opposition now have been in each other’s 
governments and cabinets at one time or another. For instance, Kibaki was Moi’s vice 
president in KANU from 1978-88. Odinga, as head of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 
joined Kibaki’s NARC government until he broke with him over a watered down 
constitutional referendum in 2005 designed to create the post of prime minister and 
decentralize government.89 Before that, Odinga was a minister under Moi until 2002 when 
Moi anointed Uhuru Kenyatta as his would be KANU candidate to succeed him as president 
in the upcoming election. Piqued at being sidelined, Odinga then went into a rainbow 
coalition of parties known as NARC with Kibaki. More recently, before the 2007 election, 
Kibaki made a seemingly unholy alliance with Moi and Biwott of KANU and with Uhuru 
Kenyatta, who by that time had shifted to the PNU, Kibaki’s new party. Odinga, then in 
another alliance of convenience to gain votes in the Rift Valley and other marginal areas, 
joined hands with questionable KANU majimboist stalwarts, who either faced gross 
corruption charges or had been named as perpetrators in the ethnic cleansing operations of 
the 1990s. All of the above was possible given the parties’ lack of ideology and their meager 
differences in party programs. 
Many other parties, aptly called “briefcase parties,” have no offices, no national 
network, and no apparent ideology. They spring up at election time to allow individuals to 
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stand as MPs. This phenomenon has increased, particularly now that MPs’ salaries have risen 
to about $190,000 annually. For instance, in the 2007 election, Limuru District in Kiambu 
Province had twenty-five individuals running to be the MP on as many different parties, 
while 2,248 candidates ran for 210 parliamentary seats.90 
Given the non-programmatic nature of Kenyan political parties, the lack of 
institutional checks on the president, his consequent personal power, and the expectations of 
benefits from clients, ethnicity is seen as critical in determining the distribution of national 
resources. In part, this explains the length to which leaders and followers are willing to go to 
get their leader in power and the means they are willing to use to achieve their ends. Hence, 
politically inspired violence has accompanied successive multiparty elections from 1992 until 
2007. Under these circumstances it is not so surprising that some of Odinga’s supporters 
threatened to burn up his farm and other property in Nyanza if he did not return home from 
negotiations after the 2007 elections with the presidency. 
During Kenyatta’s rule, other ethnic groups argued that the Kikuyu benefited, 
obtaining land and civil service jobs at their expense. Moi in turn used his power to destroy 
the Kikuyu’s economic base while rewarding his own ethnic Kalenjin and other marginal 
groups with jobs and appointments to government. Since assuming power, Kibaki also has 
been criticized for favoring the Kikuyu from his area, known as the “Mount Kenya Mafia,” 
and ignoring high-level corruption in his inner circle. Even when such views do not always 
tell the whole story, they take on a heightened significance, in part explaining why politics is 
seen as a zero sum ethnic game.  
Literature in political science has termed the above syndrome as “prebendalist,” 
“patrimonial,” and “neo-patrimonial.” Nevertheless, recent discussions of ethnicity suggest 
that “co-ethnics” often do not benefit from having one of their own in power and may even 
be taxed more than non-co-ethnics. This happens for two reasons: either because it is 
assumed they will vote for a co-ethnic anyway and hence do not need to be bought off, or 
because well to do intermediaries who mobilize the general co-ethnic population benefit at 
the latter’s expense.91 Furthermore, co-ethnics also may vote for one of their own as a 
defensive strategy, effectively against another ethnic group assuming power. As Kasara 
notes, “co-ethnics supporters are reluctant to oust rulers for fear that rival ethnic groups will 
take power and make them worse off.”92 Under these circumstances, it also may not be 
necessary to shower supporters with rewards to obtain their votes.  
This in part explains the pattern of voting in the 2007 Kenyan election and the hate 
and violence that was available to be mobilized in case of a loss. The voting was as much 
against large coalitions of ethnic groups as it was in favor of any one. PNU and its GEMA 
allies feared that Kikuyu would be displaced from their land and jobs if ODM came to power 
with Odinga’s ex-KADU majimboist allies. The “41 against one campaign” (all 41 ethnic 
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groups against the Kikuyu) and all that it implied frightened them. Moi, Biwott, and the 
Kenyatta family all joined inter ethnic hands to support Kibaki as president, principally to 
protect their fortunes in spite of ethnic and other past squabbles. This protection was 
perceived as necessary as ODM had promised to go after corruption and return what had 
been looted from the Treasury. Odinga’s run satisfied the Luo’s belief that it was “their turn” 
for the presidency, something majimboists from marginal areas were prepared to stomach in 
order to put KADU back in power and rid themselves of the Mount Kenya Kikuyu. 
Hence, the 2007 election was as much about exclusionary ethnicity and who would 
not get power and control the state’s resources as it was about who would. Understood in this 
way—and given the saliency of ethnicity due to the personalization of power, the weakness 
of institutions, the lack of programmatic parties, and the perceived importance of clientism—
it is easy to see how politicians could use political loss to politically ignite ethnic violence. 
Political economists examining the question of the circumstances under which 
ethnicity can be polarized and mobilized for political ends, including using violence, argue 
that the size of ethnic groups is a factor.93 Hence, this sort of mobilization is not 
characteristic of Tanzania or Zambia where there are large numbers of small groups rather 
than small numbers of large groups. Furthermore, Posner argues the size of ethnic groups 
tends be redefined as larger in multiparty as opposed to single party elections, something that 
has happened in Kenya.94 In the 2007 presidential election in Kenya, for example, Odinga 
took on the old KADU anti-Kikuyu alliance, and hence ODM was perceived in those terms 
by some PNU Kibaki supporters. Conversely, ODM increasingly viewed the PNU as another 
GEMA Kikuyu power grab, given the exclusion of its own MPs from Kibaki’s cabinet over 
the 2005 referendum and Kibaki’s refusal to honor a Memorandum of Understanding before 
the 2002 election that would have created the post of Prime Minister for Odinga. As former 
MP Koigi wa Wamwere has noted, “today, many express surprise that we are fighting. They 
say we buried negative ethnicity in 2002. We did not. As all united against the Kikuyu during 
the [2005 constitutional] referendum and last elections, in 2002, all united against KANU, 
Moi and the Kalenjin.”95 
None of these factors alone can explain the post-election violence; viewed together 
they demonstrate how the nature of non-programmatic, winner-take-all, clientist political 
parties fed the polarization of ethnicity for political ends, which ignited violently after a 
contested election. Nevertheless, as Laitin argues just because individuals are “mobilize[d] 
along ethnic lines” does not mean ethnic diversity is the root cause.”96 In the case of Kenya, 
the violent mobilization of ethnicity had been a political project to win elections (as well as 
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to control the state, and gain access to its resources) since the 1990s, which never was 
checked and hence thrived because of certain underlying conditions. 
Post Election Violence and Its Escalation 
“Those who came to kill me are the same people I had come to regard as relatives” (Nation, 
1/23/08. 
“Both ODM and PNU painted each other as ethnic demons” (Sunday Nation, 1/27/08). 
This paper has argued that Kenya was on a precipice before the 2007 election because of 
three factors: the state’s loss of its monopoly of legitimate force; weak governmental 
institutions overridden by a personalized, central presidency; and non-progammatic political 
parties driven by ethnic clientism and a winner-take-all view of power. The 2007 disputed 
election was the catalyst that ignited these factors. It caused Kenya to implode with violence 
that was waiting to be tapped in large parts of the country, as noted in the discussion below.97 
Violence infused the run up to the 2007 elections. Gang wars in Nairobi’s slums 
continued unabated as before. During the election campaign, the Kenya National 
Commission of Human Rights (KNCHR) and the local press documented the following 
problems98: intimidation; threats or attacks on parliamentary candidates; hate speech; the 
distribution of hate leaflets; violence between groups of rival supporters; shootings; ethnic 
clashes and the displacement of 2,000 families in Mount Elgon and Kuresui, with police 
doing nothing even when they had been informed in advance. They also noted that an 
assistant minister and another MP were transporting weapons in their vehicles, while 
journalists mentioned a run on pangas (machetes) in Nairobi’s upscale supermarket chain, 
Nakumatt. Some Kikuyu in parts of the Rift Valley that had experienced election violence 
reported being intimidated by gangs of youths and having their voting cards ripped up in 
front of them. In the Dandora housing scheme in Nairobi, Kikuyu small businessmen said 
their shops were marked for takeover in anticipation of an opposition win. Absent more 
information, it is impossible to assess the extent of these activities. 
Although the election itself was peaceful, violence escalated when Raila Odinga’s 
early lead for the presidency began to dissipate and the results were delayed amidst 
allegations of rigging. Violence consisted initially of spontaneous violence, destruction of 
property and killings along ethnic lines, first by ODM supporters in Kisumu, and then in the 
ethnically mixed slums of Nairobi, where youths armed with machete and Mungiki gang 
members went on a killing spree. It then quickly spread to other parts of the country with 
ethnically mixed populations, particularly after 30 December when the ECK declared Kibaki 
president and he was swiftly and secretly sworn in. Often, victims spoke of having been 
attacked by neighbors and fellow workers whom they had viewed as friends. 
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Organized violence of Kalenjin gangs against Kikuyus in Eldoret area quickly took 
over. Entire families of Kikuyu were burned alive in a church in Burnt Forest, property was 
torched, and many others were killed with machetes in other parts of the Rift and elsewhere 
in the country. In Uasin Gishu, properties of departed residents were stripped of their old 
signs and renamed. In response, individuals of different ethnic groups began to set up road 
blocks out of Nairobi towards Limuru and then on the main roads in and out of various parts 
of the Rift, including in and out of Naivasha, Nakuru, Kisumu and parts of Kisii. Citizens of 
various ethnic groups in different areas, who happened to be in the “wrong” place, were 
dragged from their cars, homes, and shops, and hacked to death or had their property 
destroyed. If they were from a minority ethnic group, they were asked for their identity cards, 
names, or to speak the language of their attackers and then brutally killed if they had the 
“wrong” name or spoke the “wrong” language. Property also was destroyed and towns such 
as Kisumu were decimated. 
The police finally stepped in, but with a shoot to kill policy, particularly in Kisumu, 
acts criticized both by the opposition and by human rights’ groups. Retaliatory violence then 
began in Nakuru and Naivasha with Kikuyu gangs, alleged to be Mungiki, going after both 
Luo and Kalenjin. Accusations mounted that ex-majimboist politicians in the opposition were 
responsible for the organized killings in Eldoret just as they had been in the 1990s, while the 
ODM accused government and pro-Kibaki businessmen of hiring Mungiki to carry out 
retaliatory raids. In addition, free-lance violence escalated with resulting robberies, looting of 
shops, rapes, and other crimes. Meanwhile, text messaging was full of hate and cries to get 
rid of the madoadoa (spots). 
By mid-February, over 1000- 1500 people were dead and anywhere from 350,000-
500,000 had been displaced in camps in various parts of the country. Schools and 
universities, which always had attracted students and faculty from different parts of Kenya, 
were unable to protect them and everyone who could decamped to their so-called “ancestral 
homes.” Local officials at Baraton University, a religious college in the Rift Valley, had to 
plead with gangs to allow a bus of ethnically mixed evacuees out of the compound. 
Individuals from western Kenya working in the Kikuyu tea and coffee estates and the Bata 
shoe company around Limuru took refuge in camps for internally displaced people (IDP) in 
Tigoni. Kikuyu who had lived and had businesses in Kisumu escaped to Uganda. 
Horticultural enterprises in Naivasha provided shelter for their workers from western Kenya, 
as they worried about their wilting roses and not being able to fly out their flowers to meet 
their Valentine’s Day quota in Europe. Kikuyu, Luo, and Luhya who had made their homes 
in Eldoret and other parts of the Rift for decades decamped, vowing never to return. Some 
went east some west, often to places they had never lived, now designated their ancestral 
homes.  
Even in Nairobi, some middle class workers in the upscale Kabete and Lower Kabete 
areas, who were concerned for their safety, decided to move to more ethnically homogeneous 
parts of the city. Businesses, such as polling firms, could not send staff out to do surveys 
because of the potential for violence against workers whose ethnicity was different from 
those in the areas where they were going work. The atmosphere in certain ethnically mixed 
offices was chilly, as some workers worried about being poisoned. Essentially, the idea of 
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nation had been fractured and Kenya appeared to be turning rapidly into an economically and 
politically unviable set of Bantustans. 
Diffused violence and the frittering away of the state’s monopoly of legitimate force 
took its toll in ways that can only be described as frightening. Gangs patrolled the slums, 
while also moving into some more middle class urban and rural areas. Here, they intimidated 
their hapless victims, meting out justice and robbing them. In Nakuru, young men demanded 
“youth levies” from residents. Mungiki, in turn, has been threatened journalists and human 
rights activists with harrowing text messages. Sometimes the motive appeared to be political, 
sometimes not; indicative of the state’s impotence or its abnegation of responsibility for 
maintaining law and order.  
In mid-February, a gang of thirty masked men invaded the house of ODM James 
Orengo, in upper class Runda, while other MPs asked the state for protection and 
bodyguards. In Nairobi, Kisumu, Nakuru, and elsewhere in both urban and rural areas, 
ordinary citizens found that gangs rather than the state’s security forces were in charge. They 
“issued threats,” “maintained segregation” between groups, used the pretext of hunting for 
“particular communities” to enter people’s houses and rob them, threatened those in mixed 
marriages, and forced them to move. In defense, some citizens organized their own security, 
arming themselves with guns and machetes.99 Hence, as discussed earlier, the diffusion of 
violence away from the state increasingly began to jeopardize the very integrity of the state 
itself.  
At the same time as this non-state violence was escalating and becoming more 
diffuse, the two parties took over two months to agree on a new government, with future 
discussions concerning new constitutional arrangements still pending. However, even if this 
comes to pass, new formal rules of the game may not solve Kenya’s problems. This is 
because, as earlier sections of this paper have indicated, informal rules and enforcement 
mechanisms in the past have tended to support the status quo and the interests of their actors 
while undermining formal rules, especially new ones that might disrupt it. There is no reason 
this could not happen again, particularly as political parties are clientist, non-programmatic, 
and revolve around the chief ethnic in charge winning and capturing the state.  
The additional assumption that decentralization would be a panacea also is suspect. 
The same informal rules of the game that have governed politics nationally could just be 
transferred downwards. Furthermore, as Treisman notes, in countries that are economically 
underdeveloped, federalism or decentralization actually increases rather than decreases 
corruption, contrary to current popular mythology.100 When legal systems are not effective, 
increasing the number of actors heightens corruption, something that also could be a problem 
for Kenya given its long history of having created deliberately weak institutions with little 
autonomy from the president. 
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Also with its new power sharing arrangement, Kenya now has backed tracked into a 
one party state, at least for the life of this parliament. This along with the role of diffused 
violence in politics and its associated threat to the very integrity of the state raises further 
questions concerning Kenya’s transition to democracy.  
 
Conclusions 
“In history, the stories of failure are more frequent than the stories of success.”101 
In the 1990s, policy makers and academics greeted Africa’s embrace of multi-party 
democracy and its ensuing elections with euphoria. They assumed incorrectly that most 
countries were heading down a one-way path to democracy and development. Later, some of 
the same pundits critiqued their own over reliance on elections, renaming the transition 
entities in both Africa and the former Soviet Union “virtual democracies.”102 
The point of this paper has been to dissect what happened in Kenya and explain why 
it happened. It suggests a need to look more closely at political economy factors outside the 
electoral process itself. These include the incentive systems driving the state, violence, 
institutions, and the nature of political parties, among others. The 2007 election ignited deep 
seeded historical trajectories underlying each of these factors. In many cases they suggest 
what Douglas North aptly described as “path dependence” rather than easy prospects for 
fundamental change.103 For this and other reasons discussed in the introduction to this paper, 
both the incentive system and these trajectories need to be explored further in Kenya and 
elsewhere. 
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Performance,” Perspectives on Politics 2, 1 (March 2004), 81.  
102 See Thomas Carothers, “Democracy without Illusions,” Foreign Affairs 76, (November–December 
1997), 22–43; Richard Joseph, “Democratization in Africa after 1989: Comparative Theoretical Perspectives.” 
Comparative Politics 29, 3 (April 1997), 363–82; R. Joseph, “Africa, 1990–1997. From Abertura to Closure,” 
Journal of Democracy 9, 2 (1998), 5–19. 
103 D.C. North, “Economic Performance through Time,” American Economic Review 84, 3 (1994), 359–
68. 
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